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Abstract
Choice-theoretic and philosophical accounts of rationality and reasoning address a
multi-attitude psychology, including beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. By contrast,
logicians traditionally focus on beliefs only. Yet there is logicin multiple attitudes.
We propose a generalization of the three standard logical requirements on beliefs 
consistency, completeness, and deductive closedness towards multiple attitudes.
How do these three logical requirements relate to rational requirements, e.g., of
transitive preferences or non-akratic intentions? We establish a systematic corres-
pondence: each logical requirement (consistency, completeness, or closedness) is
equivalent to a class of rational requirements. Loosely speaking, this correspond-
ence connects the logical and rational approaches to psychology. Addressing John
Broomes central question, we characterize the extent to which reasoning can help
achieve consistent, complete, or closed attitudes, respectively.
1 Introduction
Theories of rationality and choice rarely meet logic. An obstacle is that logic is
traditionally used to study beliefs and their change through reasoning, whereas
theories of rationality address a rich multi-attitude psychology, usually without
a formal model of reasoning. Yet, in an important sense, logical relations and
reasoning exist not only (as we shall say) in beliefs, but also in preferences,
in intentions, etc. For instance, preferences can be inconsistent with other pref-
erences, or be formed through reasoning (e.g., Broome 2006). In fact, logical
relations and reasoning even go across attitude types: intentions can be inconsist-
ent with beliefs, or be formed through reasoning from preferences and beliefs, etc.
We refer to this as logic and reasoning in (multi-)attitudes, a topic at the heart
of current philosophical work on rationality and reasoning. Broomes (2013) inu-
ential account of rationality and reasoning will be our benchmark, but our paper
should also resonate with other important accounts (e.g., Kolodny 2005, Boghos-
sian 2014). Reasoning in attitudes is what Broome calls reasoning withattitudes.
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We prefer saying in attitudesto mark the distinction to reasoning about attitudes,
something di¤erent, about which formal logic has much to say. One may reason
about the attitudes (the beliefs, intentions, etc.) of someone else, or perhaps even
of oneself; various logics to study such reasoning have been developed.1 Reason-
ing about attitudes is reasoning in beliefs: in beliefs about attitudes, normally of
someone else. It lets you discover these attitudes, not form them.
To relate rationality to logic, we shall import some logicinto rationality the-
ory, by extending the three classical logical conditions on beliefs  consistency,
completeness, and deductive closedness towards multiple attitudes (Sections 2-
3). This will naturally lead to a question: how do these logical requirements relate
to rational requirements, such as preference transitivity? We establish a mathem-
atical correspondence between both types of requirement (Section 4). This corres-
pondence will allow us to identify the extent to which reasoning in multi-attitude
can make ones attitudes consistent, complete, or deductively closed, respectively
(Section 5). Our analysis of logical requirements on, and reasoning in, multiple
attitudes is not logicalin the proper sense of employing syntax and semantics.
We therefore nally compare our analysis to a properly logical approach (Section
6).
2 Rational attitudes formalised
This section introduces the central Broomean concepts we need, in a formalisation
that follows Dietrich et al. (2019).
Mental states. The agent youholds mental states: beliefs, desires, prefer-
ences, intentions, etc. Let M be the non-empty set of all possible mental states or
attitudes. M might contain: believing that it rains, believing that it is sunny, de-
siring to stay dry, intending to dress warm, preferring sunshine to rain, etc. Think
of attitudes inM as pairs of an attitude content (an object) and an attitude type.
For most philosophers, contents are propositional: they are single propositions for
monadic attitudes such as belief or desire, pairs of propositions for dyadic atti-
tudes such as preference, etc. We shall say attitudenot only for mental states in
M (such as: intention to swim), but also for attitude types (such as: intention).
Constitutions. Those mental states in M you possess form your constitution.
Formally, a (mental) constitution is thus any set C M of mental states, your
states.
Rationality. Certain constitutions are rational, the others are irrational. We
identify a notion or theory of rationality with the set of constitutions it deemed
1Examples are logics for reasoning about preferences (e.g., Liu 2011), about beliefs (e.g.,
Halpern 2017), or about beliefs, desires and intentions (so-called BDI logics).
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rational. So, formally, a notion or theory of rationality is simply a set T of
constitutions, the rationalconstitutions.
An illustration. In practice, theories of rationality are dened by specifying
requirements. Rational constitutions are then constitutions satisfying those re-
quirements. To state typical requirements, let us rst formalise the structure of
states. Let L be a set of propositions. Let A be a set of attitude types, each endowed
with an arity n 2 f1; 2; :::g, which is usually 1 (for unary or monadic attitudes) or
2 (for binary or dyadic attitudes). Let A contain at least (monadic) attitudes of
belief bel, desire des, and intention int, and (dyadic) attitudes of preference  and
indi¤erence . Let the states inM be all tuples m = (p1; :::; pn; a) in which a is an
attitude type in A, n is its arity, and p1; :::; pn are propositions in L. So, (p; bel) is
belief of p, (p; int) intention of p, (p; q;) preference of p to q, etc. Here are some
typical requirements on C, more precisely requirement schemas parameterized by
propositions:
R1: Modus Ponens: Believing p and if p then q implies believing q, formally,
(p; bel); (if p then q; bel) 2 C ) (q; bel) 2 C. Parameters: p; q 2 L.
R2: Non-Contradictory Desires: Desiring p excludes desiring not p, formally,
(p; des) 2 C ) (not p; des) 62 C. Parameter: p 2 L.
R3: Enkrasia (Non-Akrasia): Believing that obligatorily p implies intending p,
formally, (obligatorily p; bel) 2 C ) (p; int) 2 C. Parameter: p 2 L.
R4: Instrumental Rationality: intending p and believing q is a means implied
by p implies intending q, formally (p; int); (q is a means implied by p; bel) 2
C ) (q; int) 2 C. Parameters: p; q 2 L.
R5: Preference Transitivity: preferring p to q and q to r implies preferring p to
r, formally, (p; q;); (q; r;) 2 C ) (p; q;) 2 C. Parameters: p; q; r 2 L.
R6: Preference Acyclicity: you do not simultaneously prefer p1 to p2, p2 to p3,
..., pk 1 to pk, and pk to p1, formally, (p1; p2;); (p2; p3;); :::; (pk 1; pk;) 2
C ) (pk; p1;) 62 C. Parameters: any number k  1 and any p1; :::; pk 2 L.
R7: Preference Completeness: you have some preference or indi¤erence between
p and q, formally (p; q;) 2 C or (q; p;) 2 C or (p; q;) 2 C. Parameters:
p; q 2 L.
Are these requirements plausible? Should we rene their formulation? Which
else should be required? These important questions are not our topic. For us, the
lesson is that any given list of requirements denes a theory of rationality: the the-
ory whereby constitutions are rational just when they satisfy these requirements,
the theorys axioms.
In stating R1R7, we have implicitly assumed that certain composite propos-
itions can be formed within L. Specically, whenever L contains propositions p
and q, L contains specic propositions not p, if p then q, obligatorily p, and q
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is a means implied by p.2 Some readers might want to model propositions syn-
tactically (intensionally): L contains the well-formed sentences of a suitable formal
language. So the mentioned composite propositions are composite sentences: not
p stands for :p, obligatorily p stands for O(p) where O is a sentential obliga-
tionoperator, etc. Other readers might want to model propositions semantically
(extensionally), as subsets of a given set of possible worlds 
. So the mentioned
composite propositions are constructed semantically: not p is the complement-
ary proposition 
np, obliganroily p is O(p), where O is a semantic obligation
operator mapping 
-subsets to 
-subsets, etc.3
3 Three logical requirements on attitudes
Having a rational constitution is an ideal you rarely meet. We now introduce
three weaker requirements. We call them logicalrequirements because they are
counterparts for multiple attitudes of the three standard logical requirements on
beliefs. The logical requirements on beliefs are:
(a) Consistency: do not believe mutually inconsistent propositions, i.e., propos-
itions which cannot be simultaneously true.
(b) Completeness. Localcompleteness says: believe a member of each proposition-
negation pair fp, not pg. General or globalcompleteness (our focus) says
something stronger: believe a member of each set of mutually exhaustive pro-
positions, i.e., propositions that cannot be simultaneously false. There are
many such sets: proposition-negation pairs fp; not pg, sets of type fp; q; [not
p] or [not q]g, etc.
(c) Closedness: believe all consequences of your beliefs, i.e., all beliefs that are
true whenever your existing beliefs are true.
2Technically, the assignments p 7! not p and p 7! obligatorily p dene two unary operators
L! L, and the assignments (p; q) 7! if p then q and (p; q) 7! q is a means implied by p dene
two dyadic operators L L! L.
3The syntactic model of propositions is appealing not only if one thinks propositions are
sentences (an implausible metaphysical view), but, more interestingly, if one thinks they are
the meaning (intension, Sinn) of sentences and can be formally represented by these sentences.
The latter view reects an intensional notion of proposition. By contrast, the semantic, i.e.,
set-theoretic, model of propositions cannot distinguish between logically equivalent propositions:
it neither snows nor rains and It is not the case that it snows or rains are represented by
the same set of worlds, hence the same proposition. This can be problematic because attitudes
can distinguish between equivalent propositions: we often believe or intend something without
believing or intending something equivalent, often out of unawareness of the equivalence. The
common label semanticalfor the extensional, set-theoretic model of propositions assumes that
semantics is about the reference (extension, denoted thing, Bedeutung) of sentences. This
assumption is questionable, to say the least. One could alternatively take semantics to be
about the meaning (intension, Sinn) of sentences, on grounds of etymology and natural usage.
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How can we generalize these logical requirements towards your full multi-attitude
psychology? That is, when should we count your constitution as consistent? As
complete? As closed? The (informal) denitions (a)-(c) cannot be directly trans-
lated from beliefs to multiple attitudes, because notions such as truthand pos-
sible worldare inappropriate in the realm of desires and other non-representational
attitudes. We cannot use truth-based denitions of multi-attitude consistency,
(global) completeness, and closedness. But rationality-based denitions are pos-
sible. Loosely speaking, rationality can substitute truth, when going beyond belief.
To see how, we rst consider beliefs, and re-express the denitions (a)-(c)
in terms of rationality rather than truth (we do this informally; for details see
Appendix B). A belief set is rationalin the fully classical sense if it is consistent,
complete and closed (completecould be dened locally or globally, and closed
could be dropped as it follows from consistentand complete). This characterizes
rationality in terms of the three logical requirements. But one can do the opposite:
characterize the logical requirements in terms of rationality: as shown in Appendix
B, a belief set is
 consistent if and only if it can be made rational by adding (zero or more)
suitable beliefs;
 complete in the global sense if and only if it can be made rational by removing
(zero or more) suitable beliefs;
 closed if and only if it contains each belief b which it entails, where entail-
menthas a rationality-based characterization, since a belief set entails b just
when all its rational extensions contain b.
These rationality-based characterizations of the logical requirements are precisely
what we need, since they can be extended to multiple attitudes:
Denition 1 Given a theory of rationality, a constitution C is
 consistent if there is a rational constitution C 0  C,
 complete if there is a rational constitution C 0  C,
 closed if C contains each attitude which it entails, where being entailed by
C means being contained in all rational constitutions C 0  C.
These denitions make intuitive sense. They treat a constitution as
 consistent if one can rationally hold at least the attitudes in it,
 complete if one can rationally hold at most the attitudes in it,
 closed if no other attitudes rationally follow.
Also formally speaking, our logical requirements for multi-attitudes generalize
their classic counterparts for beliefs: the classic requirements are special cases,
obtained if M contains only beliefs (no intentions, etc.). Why? In this belief-
only case, constitutions are equivalent to belief sets: to each constitution (a set
of belief states) corresponds a belief set (the set of contents of these beliefs), and
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our logical requirements are equivalent to the classic requirements applied to the
corresponding belief set:
Proposition 1 (stated informally) In the belief-only case, a constitution C, with
corresponding belief set B, is
 consistent if and only if B is classically consistent,
 complete if and only if B is classically complete (understood globally),
 closed if and only if B is classically closed.
This result is re-stated formally and proved in Appendix B.
4 Logical versus rational requirements
We have generalized the three logical requirements consistency, completeness,
closedness  from beliefs to multi-attitudes. This allows logical talk about your
multi-attitude psychology, as opposed to standard rationality talk. But how do the
three logical requirements relate to typical rational requirements such as those in
R1R7? The di¤erence between typical rational requirements and logical require-
ments is fundamental. For one, generic rational requirements are concrete and
refer to specic attitudes (such as preferences in R5R7, or intentions and beliefs
in R3R4), whereas the three logical requirements are purely structural, without
reference to specic attitude types. For another, generic rational requirements
have a status of axiomsused to dene theories of rationality, whereas logical re-
quirements have a derived status, as they follow from (the axioms of) a theory. For
instance, transitivity of preferences, a typical rationality requirement (or schema
thereof), counts as an axiom in choice theory.
Despite their fundamental di¤erences, the two kinds of requirement stand in
a tight formal relationship: each logical requirement is equivalent to a particular
class of rational requirements. Before stating this theorem, we note that most
rational requirements found in philosophy or choice theory t into the following
three-kind typology, which is implicit in various works and spelt out formally in
Dietrich et al. (2019):
Denition 2 A requirement is a condition on constitutions, formally a set R of
constitutions (those satisfying the requirement). It is a
 consistency requirement if it forbids having all of certain mental states,
i.e., R = fC : not F  Cg for some set F 6= ? of states (the forbidden
set),
 completeness requirement if it forbids having none of certain attitudes,
i.e., R = fC : not C \ U = ?g for some set U 6= ? of attitudes (the
unavoidable set),
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 closedness requirement is if it demands that having certain attitudes im-
plies having a certain attitude, i.e., R = fC : P  C ) c 2 Cg for some set
of (premise-)attitudes P and some (conclusion-)attitude c.
Standard requirements, like those in R1R7, fall into this typology:
 Non-Contradictory Desires (R2) and Preference Acyclicity (R6) are schemas
of consistency requirements, with forbidden set f(p; des); (not p; des)g or
f(p1; p2;); (p2; p3;); :::; (pk 1; pk;); (pk; p1;)g, respectively.
 Preference Completeness (R7) is a schema of completeness requirements,
with unavoidable set f(p; q;); (q; p;); (p; q;)g.
 Modus Ponens (R1), Enkrasia (R3), Instrumental Rationality (R4), and Pref-
erence Transitivity (R5) are schemas of closedness requirements, in R1 with
premise set f(p; bel); (if p then q; bel)g and conclusion state (q; bel).
A requirement is a rational requirement if it follows from the given theory of
rationality:
Denition 3 The requirements of a theory of rationality T for short, the
rational requirements are those requirements R that follow from T , i.e., for
which T  R.
Typical theories of rationality make several consistency, completeness, or closed-
ness requirements, such as those in R1R7. More is true: the axioms or principles
by which theories of rationality are dened in practice  such as transitivity of
preferences  are usually (schemas of) consistency, completeness, or closedness
requirements.
Technically, also the three logical requirements are rational requirements, though
atypical ones as they make no reference to attitude types (such as preferences) and
have a logicrather than rationalityavour. Formally:
Remark 1 Given a theory of rationality T , the three logical requirements con-
sistency, completeness, closedness are rationality requirements of T .4
So, the right contrast to draw is one, not between logical and rational require-
ments simpliciter, but between logical requirements and generic rational require-
ments as encountered in rationality theory, such as those in R1R7 and many
others. Unlike logical requirements, generic rational requirements normally belong
to our three-kind typology.
A question has become pressing: how does the logical approach to multi-
attitude psychology, with its three logical requirements, relate to the rationality-
based approach, with its three classic types of rational requirement? This is the
promised correspondence:
4Technically, consistency is the requirement R = fC : C is consistentg, and similarly for
completeness and closedness.
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Theorem 1 Given any theory of rationality T 6= ?, a constitution C is
(a) consistent if and only if it satises all consistency requirements of T ,
(b) complete if and only if it satises all completeness requirements of T ,
(c) closed if and only if it satises all closedness requirements of T ,
(d) fully rational if and only if it satises all requirements of T .
Parts (a)(c) of this result connect the logical world of structural requirements
to the choice-theoretic or philosophical world of individual rational requirements
of three types. Part (d) is an addendum, of interest in its own right.
This result is purely static, by concerning coherence at a given time. But it has
important implications for the dynamic process of reasoning. Which implications?
5 Are logical requirements achievable through
reasoning?
Your constitution is usually inconsistent, incomplete, and unclosed. Can reasoning
help you satisfy these logical requirements? This question is a cousin of Broomes
central question: can reasoning help achieve rational requirements, such as (in-
stances of) Preference Transitivity or Enkrasia? The tight connection between
rational and logical requirements (Theorem 1) suggests an equally tight connec-
tion between Broomes and our question, i.e., between whether reasoning makes
more rationaland whether it makes more logical. We will conrm this conjec-
ture.
Unlike Broome, we set aside whether reasoning is correct in some objective
sense. Our conclusions about becoming more logicalthrough reasoning will be
largely negative, and would get further reinforced by excluding incorrect reasoning.
5.1 Reasoning in attitudes
To pave the way, we now briey discuss the Broomean notion of reasoning adopted
here, and formalise it following Dietrich et al. (2019). For Broome (2013) and
others, reasoning is a process of forming attitudes from existing attitudes: forming
intentions from intentions and beliefs, or preferences from preferences, etc. The
process is causal. Unlike other causal processes, it is conscious and constitutes a
mental act. You bring the premise-attitudes to mind by sayingtheir contents
to yourself, usually through internal speech. This causes you to constructand
thereby acquire some conclusion-attitude, again using (usually internal) speech.
Here is a stylised instance of reasoning with a single premise. You say this to
yourself:
Doctors recommend resting. So, I shall rest.
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This is reasoning from a belief to an intention. The Sois not part of the con-
clusion, but expresses the act of drawing the conclusion. Note the use of shall:
it is a linguistic marker indicating that the conclusion forms an intention. Had
you concluded in a belief with same content, you would have said I will rest.
In general, you say to yourself, not contents of attitudes simpliciter, but marked
contents, i.e., contents with a marker indicating how you entertain the content: as
a belief, or an intention, etc. The English language provides markers for various
attitudes. Beliefs are special: they need no explicit marker (in English), as the
same sentence expresses the content and the marked content.
Reasoning is rule-governed: you draw the conclusion by following a rule. Rules
can be individuated more or less broadly. In the example, the rule could be:
 specic: from believing that doctors recommend resting, towards intending
to rest.
 broader: From believing that doctors recommend -ing towards intending to
. Parameter: any act .
 even broader: From believing that experts E recommend -ing towards in-
tending to . Parameters: any experts E and act .
We shall work with specic rules, to avoid dealing with schemas or parameters.
Nothing hinges on this technical choice: our results could be re-stated (more clum-
sily) using a broader notion of rules. Given our choice, we can identify a rule with
a specic premises/conclusion combination. Technically, a reasoning rule is a
pair (P; c) of a set of (premise-)attitudes P  M and a (conclusion-)attitude
c 2M , representing the formation of c from P . In the rule of the example above,
P contains just the belief that doctors recommend resting, and c is the intention
to rest. You follow certain rules yourrules. The totality of your rules is your
reasoning system, representing your reasoning policy. Technically, a reasoning
system is a set S of reasoning rules. Starting from your initial constitution, you
can reason which each of your rules: whenever you already have a rules premise-
attitudes, you form the conclusion-attitude, which gets added to your constitution.
You can do this until your constitution is stable. A constitution C is stable un-
der S (under reasoning) if reasoning makes no change, i.e., C already contains
the conclusion-attitude of each rule in S whose premise-attitudes it contains. The
stable constitution reached by reasoning from your initial constitution C using
your reasoning system S is denoted CjS and called the revision of C through
S (through reasoning). Technically, CjS is dened as the minimal extension
of C stable under S.5 Provided your reasoning system S is nite, you can reach
CjS is in nitely many reasoning steps. You rst apply a rule (P; c) in S that is
e¤ective (di¤erence-making) on C, i.e., for which P  C but c 62 C; your constitu-
tion becomes C [fcg. You then apply another rule (P 0; c0) in S that is e¤ective on
5This (with respect to set-inclusion) minimal stable extension exists and is unique. It is the
intersection of all stable extensions C 0  C.
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C [ fcg; your constitution becomes C [ fc; c0g. You continue until all your rules
are ine¤ective. The order in which you reason, i.e., apply rules, is irrelevant: you
inevitably converge to the same stable constitution CjS. All this can be stated
formally.6
5.2 Which logical requirements are achievable?
What would it mean to achieve a logical requirement (or even full rationality)
through reasoning?
Denition 4 Given a theory of rationality, a reasoning system S achieves con-
sistency, completeness, closedness, or (full) rationality if for each consti-
tution C the revision CjS is, respectively, consistent, complete, closed, or rational.
There would be little point in achieving completeness or closedness if one
thereby sacrices consistency, the arguably most basic and least sacricableof the
three logical requirements. We therefore want reasoning to preserve consistency,
in the following sense:
Denition 5 Given a theory of rationality, a reasoning system S preserves con-
sistency if for each consistent constitution C its revision CjS is still consistent.
By Theorem 1, the achievement of consistency, completeness, or closedness is
equivalent to the achievement of particular rationality requirements. But whether
these rationality requirements are achievable is known; it is informally contained
in Broomes work, and formally worked out in Dietrich et al. (2019). Details aside,
reasoning can successfully achieve closedness requirements, but not consistency or
completeness requirements. Using this fact (including details we have skipped),
Theorem 1 has another theorem as a corollary, namely that:
 reasoning can achieve closedness while preserving consistency,
 reasoning cannot achieve consistency,
 reasoning can achieve completeness, but only while sacricing consistency.
Formally:
Theorem 2 Given any theory of rationality,
(a) some reasoning system achieves closedness while preserving consistency,
6Write Cjr1jr2j    jrn for the result of revising C through rule r1, then through rule r2, etc.
until rn. For nite S, CjS can be shown to equal Cjr1jr2j    jrn for any sequence (r1; :::; rn)
of S-rules that is maximal subject to each rule ri being e¤ective on the previously reached
constitution Cjr1jr2j    jri 1. In this representation of CjS through consecutive reasoning, the
sequence (r1; :::; rn) (the way to reason) is only to a limited extent unique: all such sequences
(r1; :::; rn) have the same length (number of reasoning steps) n and the same set of conclusion-
attitudes fc : some of r1; :::; rn concludes in cg.
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(b) no reasoning system achieves consistency, unless (trivially) all constitutions
are consistent,
(c) no reasoning system achieves completeness while preserving consistency, un-
less the theory deems each set of falsiable states avoidable,
(d) no reasoning system achieves full rationality, unless (trivially) all constitu-
tions are consistent.
The denitions of avoidable and falsiable in part (c) are given shortly.
In parts (b) and (d), one can replace all constitutions are consistent by the
all-attitudes constitution C = M is rationala case of a degenerate theory of
rationality. The word unlessin parts (b)(d) can be read not only in its weak
sense (if it is not the case that), but even in its strong sense (if and only if it is
not the case that). So Theorem 2 provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
the possibility of successful reasoning, in four senses, i.e., becoming consistent,
complete, closed, or fully rational.7
The message of Theorem 1 seems devastating, though Broomean: you cannot
reason towards two of three logical requirements, just as (following Broome) you
cannot reason towards many rational requirements. This result is independent of
the attitude type: it even holds for ordinary reasoning in beliefs. A more nuanced
picture emerges after cashing in that other mental processes than reasoning could
jump in to make your attitudes inch closer to completeness (by creating attitudes)
or consistency (by removing attitudes). For instance, some beliefs or intentions
might crowd out other ones that are inconsistent with them, making you more
consistent. We can become more logical, but not through reasoning alone.
We now discuss each part in turn.
Part (a): the achievability of closedness. By part (a), you can develop
deductively closed attitudes through reasoning, without losing consistency. Why?
By Theorem 1, closedness is achieved once all the theorys closedness requirements
are achieved. A closedness requirement says: having a certain set of attitudes P
implies having a certain attitude c. You achieve this requirement if you have the
rule r = (P; c). You achieve all of the theorys closedness requirements if you have
all corresponding rules. If these are your only rules, reasoning provably preserves
consistency. Although this reasoning system does the job, it is peculiar: it is so rich
in rules that you can reason towards each closedness requirement of the theory in a
single step. In practice, much slimmer (and cognitively more plausible) reasoning
systems do the same job of achieving closedness while preserving consistency. You
only need rules corresponding to certain closedness requirements of the theory.
Suppose rationality requires that believing p and if p then q implies believing
7In part (c), the stronger reading of unlesshowever requires a compactness assumption: each
inconsistent set of states C M has a nite inconsistent subset. Compactness holds trivially if
M is nite. Compactness is the multi-attitude counterpart of ordinary logical compactness.
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q, and that believing q implies intending r. Then rationality also requires that
believing p and if p then q implies intending r. If you have the rules corresponding
to the rst two closedness requirements,
r = (f(p; bel); (if p then q; bel)g; (q; bel)) and r0 = (f(q; bel)g; (r; int)),
then you need not have the rule corresponding to the third requirement, r00 =
(f(p; bel); (if p then q; bel)g; (r; int)), because the third requirement is achievable
through applying rst r and then r0. Real people presumably reason with few and
simple rules.
Part (b): the unachievability of consistency. Part (b) is mathematic-
ally trivial, but philosophically disturbing. It is trivial (without even consulting
Theorem 1) because Broomean reasoning never removes attitudes, hence never
makes inconsistent constitutions consistent. Broome acknowledges that inconsist-
encies often disappear, but insists that they disappear, not through reasoning,
but through automatic psychological processes, such as when you nd yourself
losing a belief after realizing a conict with other beliefs. The impossibility to
reason yourself out of inconsistency is disturbing because consistency is a more
basic normative desideratum than completeness and closedness. One would have
hoped that reasoning can at least make consistent; instead it can make closed, but
not consistent. The problem is only avoided for trivial theories of rationality that
deem all constitutions consistent.
Part (c): the unachievability of completeness. Why does part (c) hold? By
Theorem 1, completeness is achieved once the theorys completeness requirements
are achieved. Each completeness requirement demands having at least one attitude
from some unavoidableset U . The unavoidable sets of a theorys completeness
requirements are precisely what we call the unavoidable setssimpliciter, dened
as follows:
Denition 6 Given a theory of rationality, a set of attitudes is avoidable if some
rational constitution contains none of its states, and unavoidable otherwise.
Now, a constitution satises the theorys completeness requirements just when
it intersects the theorys unavoidable sets. Among these sets might be ones of type
f(p; bel); (not p; bel)g, f(p; int); (q; int); (r; int)g, f(p; q;); (q; p;); (p; q;)g, etc.
There is a trivial (but problematic) way to achieve non-empty intersections with
unavoidable sets (hence completeness): for each unavoidable set U , have a rule
that systematically generates a given attitude in U (formally, a rule r = (?;m)
without premise-attitudes and with some conclusion-attitude m in U).
This trivial way to reason is unconvincing. It seems ad hoc, if not stubborn
and blind, to always acquire the same attitude from a given unavoidable set U ,
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regardless of the web of existing attitudes. It matters which attitude from U
you form, technically because you should preserve consistency. It for instance
matters which intention (from an unavoidable set of intentions) you form, to stay
consistent with your beliefs and preferences. Unfortunately, not only the trivial
reasoning system, but all reasoning systems which achieve completeness fail to
preserve consistency.
However, a rule forming an attitude m can only cause inconsistency if m is in
potential conict with other attitudes, i.e., there exist other attitudes with which
m is inconsistent. In this case m is called falsiable. Formally:
Denition 7 Given a theory of rationality, an attitude m is falsiable if some
consistent constitution becomes inconsistent through adding m.
Usually, attitudes are falsiable. For instance, if rationality requires Non-
Contradictory Desires (R2), any desire (p; des) is falsiable, as f(p; des); (not
p; des)g is inconsistent. Part (c) rules out that all sets of falsiable attitudes are
avoidable, because otherwise all unavoidable sets contain a non-falsiable attitude,
so that the mentioned inconsistency problem cannot arise.
Part (d): the unachievability of full rationality. Since consistency is un-
achievable by part (b), so is full rationality. This again presupposes that not all
constitutions count as consistent otherwise you could trivially become rational
by having all reasoning rules, making you form all attitudes.
6 The di¤erent way formal logic goes beyond be-
lief
Our analysis of multi-attitude psychology has been logicalin a light sense: we
have analysed logical requirements and reasoning without ever employing formal
syntax or semantics. But also formal logic has much to say about attitudes, using
logics of beliefs, preferences, or other attitudes. How does our light-logical analysis
relate to a formal-logical analysis? As we shall see, both go beyond belief in
di¤erent senses, and pursue di¤erent objectives. Formal logic provides a third-
personal description of attitudes, suitable for reasoning about someones attitudes,
but not for addressing multi-attitude psychology in an internal, rst-personal sense.
We shall distinguish between the statics (Section 6.1) and the dynamics (Section
6.2) of multiple attitudes, arguing that the di¤erence between both approaches
emerges in the dynamics, i.e., in reasoning.
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6.1 The statics of multiple attitudes
The statics of multi-attitudes concern your attitudes at a given time. The three
logical requirements consistency, completeness, closedness are purely static re-
quirements. We were able to formalise them without properly logicaltools. An
alternative approach would use some formal logic of attitudes. Logics of attitudes
exist in abundance. Mono-modal logics involve just one attitude, for instance
belief in doxastic logics(e.g., Fagin 1995, Halpern 2017), or preferences in pref-
erence logics(e.g., Liu 2011). Multi-modal logics involve two or more attitudes,
for instance beliefs, desires and intentions in BDI logics(e.g., Van der Hoek and
Wooldridge 2003). Attitudes are represented by modal operators, and rationality
by axioms. No doubt, this machinery is well-suited for studying the statics of
multiple attitudes, including nested attitudes (meta-attitudes) such as intentions
to desire to believe something. Like our light-logical machinery, such modal lo-
gics could be used to dene notions of attitudinal consistency, completeness, and
closedness, though one would be limited to the (often few) attitudes present in the
logic in question.
6.2 The dynamics of multiple attitudes
The dynamics of multi-attitudes concern attitude change. Modal logics of the sort
just discussed can address reasoning about rather than in attitudes for reasons
independent of the attitude type, hence valid even for ordinary reasoning in beliefs.
Establishing that this di¤erence is real and could not be overcome through some
formal reduction requires a careful analysis, which we undertake in Dietrich et
al. (2020). Here, a few remarks should su¢ ce. If someone reasons about your
attitudes, then what changes are not your attitudes, but the reasoners beliefs
about them. Even if it is you yourself who reasons about some of your attitudes,
then not those attitudes change, but your (meta-)beliefs about them.8 In our
earlier example, you reason in your attitudes by saying:
Doctors recommend resting. So, I shall rest.
You thereby form an intention from a belief. An observer (possibly you) might
reason about your attitudes by saying:
You believe doctors recommend resting. So, you intend to rest.
This and other reasoning about attitudes can be represented modal-logically, as
following entailments between atomic attitude-sentences of type you hold atti-
tude such-and-such towards such-and-such, formally O() with an operator O
8Your introspective reasoning may spark some causal process that changes your attitudes (in
some direction), but this is another issue.
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representing the attitude type and a sentence  representing the attitude content.
Thanks to appropriate axioms, the right entailments hold between such atomic
attitude-sentences. The logic also provides entailments between plenty of non-
atomicattitude-sentences, such as: you do not desire this, you either believe
this or intend that, etc. Reasoning about attitudes can thus start from, or con-
clude in absences of attitudes, disjunctions of attitudes, etc. Reasoning cannot, as
Broome insists. This marks another fundamental di¤erence between internal reas-
oning and logical entailment, hence between practical reasoning and theoretical
reasoning about attitudes.
A Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix, we x a theory of rationality T and a constitution C. Let T 6= ?,
an assumption needed only in parts (a) and (b). We now prove each part.
Part (a). We prove both directions of implication. We may assume C 6= ?,
since otherwise C is trivially consistent (as T 6= ?) and satises all consistency
requirements.
 First let C satisfy Ts consistency requirements. We show that C is consist-
ent. Consider the consistency requirement R of not holding all states in C:
R = fC 0 : C 6 C 0g. Since C violates R while satisfying Ts consistency re-
quirements, R cannot be a requirement of T . So some rational constitution
C 0 2 T violates R, i.e., C  C 0. So C is consistent.
 Conversely, assume C is consistent. Consider any consistency requirement R
of T ; we must prove that C satises it. R takes the form R = fC 0 : F 6 C 0g
for some forbidden setF . Being consistent, C has a rational extension C+.
As C+ is rational, it satises Ts requirements, so satises R, i.e., F 6 C+.
As C  C+, it follows that F 6 C. So C satises R.
Part (b). The proof is the dualof that for part (a). We may suppose C 6= M ,
because otherwise C is trivially complete (as T 6= ?) and satises all completeness
requirements.
 First let C satisfy Ts completeness requirements. We show that C is com-
plete. Note that C violates the (completeness) requirement of containing
a state outside C, R = fC 0 : (MnC) \ C 0 6= ?g. So, as C satises Ts
completeness requirements, R is not a requirement of T . So some rational
constitution C 0 2 T violates R; hence (MnC) \ C 0 = ?, i.e., C 0  C. So C
is complete.
 Conversely, let C be complete. Let R be any completeness requirement of
T ; we show that C satises it. R requires having at least one states from
an (unavoidable) set U : R = fC 0 : C 0 \ U 6= ?g. As C is complete, it has
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a rational subset C . Being rational, C  satises Ts requirements, hence
satises R, i.e., C  \U 6= ?. So, as C   C, C \U 6= ?. Hence, C satises
R.
Part (c). Again, both directions of implication are to be shown.
 First, let C satisfy Ts closedness requirements. To show that C is closed,
consider a state m entailed by C; we must show that m 2 C. Consider the
closedness requirement R with set of premise states C and conclusion state
m: R = fC 0 : C  C 0 ) m 2 C 0g. As C entails m, R is a requirement of
T . So, as C satises Ts closedness requirements, it satises R. Hence, as
C  C, we have m 2 C.
 Conversely, assume C is closed. Consider a closedness requirement R of the
theory, say R = fC 0 : P  C 0 ) c 2 C 0g for some (premise) set P  M
and some (conclusion) state c 2 M . To show that C satises R, assume
P  C; we must prove c 2 C. Since R is a requirement of T , all rational
constitutions which include P contain c, which in turn means that P entails
c (by denition of entailment). So also the larger set C  P entails c (again
by denition of entailment). Hence c 2 C, as C is closed.
Part (d). Trivially, rationality is equivalent to satisfaction of the theorys strongest
requirement R = T , which is equivalent to satisfaction of all the theorys require-
ments R  T . 
B Proposition 1 stated formally and proved
Our claim to have generalized consistency, completeness and closedness from beliefs
towards multiple attitudes rests on Proposition 1, which we now re-state formally
and prove. This appendix section assumes the belief-only case: M contains only
belief-attitudes. Formally, let M = f(p; bel) : p 2 Lg, where bel is belief and L is
the set of propositions, modelled either syntactically or semantically, as dened in
Section 2.9
A belief set is any set of (believed) propositions B  L. As belief is the
only attitude, constitutions are notational variants of belief sets: to a constitution
C  M corresponds a belief set B = fp : (p; bel) 2 Cg, and to a belief set B
corresponds a constitution C = f(p; bel) : p 2 Bg.
Classically, a belief set B  L is
9In the syntactic case we assume that the logic is a standard propositional logic, or more
generally any well-behaved logic such as a standard propositional, predicate, modal, or condi-
tional logic. Formally, the logic must obey a few classic conditions (namely L1L4 in Dietrich
2007) which guarantee regularnotions of logical consistency and logical entailment. The not-
able condition is monotonicity, whereby entailments are preserved under adding premises, and
so consistency of a set is preserved under removing elements.
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 consistent if it is members can be jointly true. Given the semantic model,
this means that \b2Bb 6= ?. Given the syntactic model, it means that B
entails no contradiction.
 (deductively) closed if it contains all p 2 L which it entails. In the semantic
model, this means that \b2Bb  p.
 locally complete if it contains a member of each proposition-negation pair,
i.e., each pair fp;
npg  L (given the semantic model) or each pair fp;:pg 
L (given the syntactic model).
 globally complete if it contains a member of each exhaustive set Y  L. A
set Y  L is exhaustive if necessarily at least one member is true. i.e.,
if [p2Y p = 
 (given the semantic model) or if the set f:p : p 2 Y g is
inconsistent (given the syntactic model). The simplest exhaustive sets are the
proposition-negation pairs. Global completeness implies local completeness,
by quantifying over all exhaustive sets, not just the proposition-negation
pairs. An equivalent denition of globally complete is given in Lemma
1(b).
The four conditions on belief sets are far from independent: any consistent and
locally complete belief set is automatically deductively closed and globally com-
plete. The gold standard of rational beliefs in logic is to satisfy all these conditions.
We can talk of classical rationalityif that gold standard is met. Formally, in our
belief-only case the classical theory of rationality deems a constitution C  M
rational just when the corresponding belief set is consistent and complete (and
hence closed). Formally:
Denition 8 In the belief-only case A = fbelg (with the semantic or syntactic
model of L), the classical theory or notion of rationality is
T = fC : the belief set fp : (p; bel) 2 Cg is consistent & completeg:
We are ready to re-state Proposition 1 formally:
Proposition 1 Under the belief-only case A = fbelg (with the semantic or syn-
tactic model of L) and the classical theory of rationality, a constitution is
 consistent if and only if the corresponding belief set is consistent,
 complete if and only if the corresponding belief set is globally complete,
 closed if and only if the corresponding belief set is closed.10
Since complete constitutions correspond not to complete, but to strongly com-
plete belief sets, one might ask what type of constitutions correspond to locally
complete belief sets. The answer is obvious: those constitutions C such that each
proposition-negation pair in L has a member q such that (q; bel) 2 C.
10In the syntactic case we assume the logic is well-behaved as dened in footnote 9.
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To prove the result, we rst show that the notions of consistency, strong com-
pleteness and closedness for belief sets can be re-described in a way that corres-
ponds precisely to our denitions of consistency, completeness and closedness for
constitutions. The result should be partly familiar to logicians:
Lemma 1 Given the semantic or syntactic model of L, a belief set B  L is
(a) consistent if and only if B  B0 for some complete and consistent belief set
B0  L,
(b) complete (understood globally) if and only if B  B0 for some complete and
consistent belief set B0,
(c) closed if and only if B contains each proposition contained in all complete
and consistent extensions B0  B (equivalently, B is the intersection of these
extensions).11
Proof. Suppose the lemmas assumptions. Let B  L be a belief set, and B the
set of complete and consistent belief sets.
(a) We distinguish between the semantic and syntactic model of L. In the
semantic case the equivalence holds trivially (if B is consistent, we can pick a
w 2 \p2Bp and dene B0 as fp 2 L : w 2 pg). In the syntactic case the equivalence
follows from a basic property in logic, often referred to as Lindenbaums lemma,
which states that any consistent set of sentences in a logic is extendable to a
complete and still consistent set. This property holds in well-behaved logics of the
sort assumed here (see footnote 9).
(b) First let B have a subset B0 2 B. To show that B is strongly complete,
consider any exhaustive set Y  L. We must prove that B \ Y 6= ?. As B0  B
it su¢ ces to show that Y \ B0 6= ?, which holds by the following argument to be
spell out for the syntactic and the semantic case:
 In the syntactic case, note that the (inconsistent) set f:p : p 2 Y g cannot
be a subset of the (consistent) set B0. So there is a p 2 Y such that :p 62 B0,
and thus p 2 B0 as B0 is complete. So Y \B0 6= ?.
 In the semantic case, since f
np : p 2 Y g has empty intersection (as Y has
union 
) while B0 has non-empty intersection (as B0 is consistent), the set
f
np : p 2 Y g cannot be a subset of B0. So there is a p 2 Y such that

np 62 B0, and hence p 2 B0 as B0 is complete. So Y \B0 6= ?.
Conversely, assume that B does not include any B0 2 B, and let us show
that B is not strongly complete. By assumption, for each B0 2 B we may pick
a pB0 2 B0nB. Let Y := fpB0 : B0 2 Bg. This set Y is exhaustive, both in the
semantic case (here each world ! 2 
 belongs to some member of Y , namely to
pB0 with B0 := fp 2 L : ! 2 pg) and also in the syntactic case (here f:p : p 2 Y g
is not included in any B0 2 B and so is inconsistent by (a)). Yet Y \ B = ? by
construction of Y . So B is not strongly complete.
11In case of the syntactic model we assume the logic is well-behaved as dened in footnote 9.
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(c) We must show that B is closed if and only if B = \B02B:B0BB0. In
the syntactic case, this is a familiar fact, valid in in well-behaved logics of the
sort considered here (see footnote 9). Now consider the semantic case. Note
that \B02B:B0BB0 is closed (in fact, not just in the semantic case). So if B =
\B02B:B0BB0 then B is automatically closed. Conversely, if B is closed, then
B = fp 2 L : p  \q2Bqg, from which it easily follows that B = \B02B:B0BB0. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the propositions assumptions. Let C be a
constitution. We denote the content of a (belief) state m by bm and the belief set
corresponding to a constitution C M by bC = fbm : m 2 Cg.
First,
C is consistent , C  C 0 for some C 0 2 T
, bC cC 0 for some C 0 2 T
, bC  B for some consistent and complete B  L
, bC is consistent, by Lemma 1(a).
Second,
C is complete , C  C 0 for some C 0 2 T
, bC cC 0 for some C 0 2 T
, bC  B for some consistent and complete B  L
, bC is strongly complete, by Lemma 1(b).
Third, writing bT := f bC : C 2 Tg = fB  L : B is complete and consistentg,
C is closed , C 3 m for all m entailed by C, i.e., all m 2 \C02T :C0CC 0
, bC 3 bm for all m entailed by C, i.e., all m 2 \C02T :C0CC 0
, bC 3 b for all b entailed by bC, i.e., all b 2 \B2bT :B bCB
, bC is closed, by Lemma 1(c). 
C Proof of Theorem 2
Throughout the proof, let T be any theory of rationality. Generalizing Denition
4, we say that a reasoning system S achieves a requirement R if CjS satises
R for all constitutions C. Note that for each of parts (b), (c) and (d) we have to
prove two directions of implication, as we read unlessas if and only if it is not
the case that.
Given the contradictory theory T = ?, all four parts hold trivially. Part (a)
holds because the maximal reasoning system S, which contains all rules, does the
job: it achieves closedness by transforming each constitution into M (the only
closed constitution), and it vacuously preserves consistency by the absence of con-
sistent constitutions. Parts (b), (c) and (d) hold because consistency, completeness
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and rationality are all trivially unachievable by the absence of any consistent, com-
plete or rational constitutions (regarding (c), note also the absence of avoidable
sets).
Henceforth let T 6= ?. We prove the four parts in turn.
Part (a). By Theorem 1(c), achieving closedness is equivalent to achieving all
closedness requirements of T . Meanwhile, by Theorem 1 in Dietrich et al. (2019)
there exists a reasoning schema S which achieves all closedness requirements and
preserves consistency. So S achieves closedness while preserving consistency.
Part (b). First, in the (degenerate) case that the maximal constitution C = M
is rational, all constitutions are consistent, and so consistency is trivially achieved
by any reasoning system. Conversely, assume the maximal constitution C = M
is irrational. Let S be any reasoning system; we show that it fails to achieve
consistency. As M is irrational, there is an inconsistent constitution C (e.g.,
C = M). As CjS  C, also CjS is inconsistent.
Part (c). First, assume avoidability of each set of falsiable states (along with
the background assumption of compactness, whereby each inconsistent set of states
has a nite inconsistent subset). For each unavoidable set U we can pick a non-
falsiable state mU 2 U . The reasoning system S = f(?;mU) : U is unavoidableg
achieves each completeness requirement of theory T , because for each completeness
requirement of T a state from its unavoidable set is formed. So S achieves com-
pleteness simpliciter, by Theorem 1. We now show that S preserves consistency.
For a contradiction, consider a consistent constitution C such that CjS is inconsist-
ent. By compactness, CjS has a nite inconsistent subset C 0. By denition of S,
CjS = C [fmU : U is an unavoidable setg: So we may pick nitely many unavoid-
able sets U1; :::; Uk such that C 0  C [ fmU1 ;mU2 ; :::;mUkg. Since C is consistent,
so is C[fmU1g, asmU1 is non-falsiable; hence so is C[fmU1 ;mU2g, asmU2 is non-
falsiable. Repeating this argument k times, it follows that C[fmU1 ;mU2 ; :::;mUkg
is consistent. Hence its subset C 0 is consistent.
Conversely, suppose some set of falsiable states is unavoidable. Let R be the
corresponding completeness requirement. It su¢ ces to show that no reasoning
system achieves R, because by Theorem 1 achieving completeness is equivalent to
achieving all completeness requirements of the theory. By Theorem 3 in Dietrich
et al. (2019), no reasoning system achieves any completeness requirement of the
theory whose unavoidable set consists of falsiable states. So no reasoning system
S achieves R.
Part (d). First, for (degenerate) theories that deem C = M rational, rationality
is trivially achieved by the reasoning system S containing all rules, for which
CjS = M for all initial constitutions C. Conversely, if C = M is irrational, the
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unachievability of rationality follows from that of the weaker demand of consistency
(see part (b)). 
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